Emaj Magazine

Free elections in Tunisia, the death of Muammar Gaddafi, and bloody crackdowns on protesters in Syria – the Arab Spring continues to shake the region’s foundations. With the whole world holding its breath at this chapter of history evolving in front of our eyes, it is still rather difficult to grasp the political dynamite of in the cradle of it all, the Maghreb.

Compared to its notoriously mediatised neighbour, the Middle East, the Maghreb is a cultural and geo-strategic terra incognita for most political commentators. To their chagrin, easy generalizations about a wave of democracy sweeping across the region, with one dictatorial domino falling after the other, simply do not apply. One of the reasons is that Morocco does not fit into the pattern: there protests remain muted and political responses overall forthcoming. How come? And where to from here? I sat down with Hein de Haas, the co-director of Oxford University’s International Migration Institute, whose passionate interest in Moroccan politics and society would surely make for some interesting insights.

SRM: I am often asked why we have not seen a revolutionary uprising in Morocco comparable to that of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. My spontaneous explanations run along the lines of the political climate in Morocco being of a much more benign nature, and that – though not free of discontents – the population genuinely supports the monarchy. For the most part people strive for progress within the system, not a complete revision of the system itself. What is your opinion?

[HdH] I think that part of the explanation might be that the political system in Morocco has allowed for more internal pluralism and freedom of expression, particularly since the late 1990s. In that sense, the social climate has become less marked by the fear that characterized public life particularly in Libya and Tunisia. However, real increases in freedom of expression and civil rights in Morocco have remained fundamentally limited, as direct criticism of the King, as well as issues of ‘national concern’ such as the Western Sahara, the position of religion are still taboo.

Secondly, despite increased freedom of expression, no genuine democratization has occurred. The King still dominates the political scene and the recent constitutional reform does not constitute a major break with the past. In addition, Moroccans experience similar socio-economic frustrations as other North Africans, in the form of high unemployment, rampant inequality, corruption and a general lack of perspective. I think that, until recently, Moroccans have reason to feel less suffocated than Tunisians or Libyans in freedom of expression, but the sources of their discontent about poverty and social injustice are the same, or worse. In terms of poverty, education and social development Morocco is actually trailing far behind Tunisia these days. So, I think it is an illusion this revolution will not affect Morocco; so for its own survival the Morocco ruling class would be wise to start genuine reforms towards real democratization. These could work out, because the reforms of the past decade have given rise to a vibrant civil society in Morocco. But if no reform occurs, things might also easily come to a boiling point in Morocco.

SRM: Political unrest in the country has been relatively contained, with the February 20 movement garnering some degree of support from a number of left-wing and Islamist political parties, NGOs, and labour unions, but failing to organize mass demonstrations. Do you think this movement will grow in strength, or could Mohammed VI’s gradual reform approach quench the desire for more radical change?

[HdH] Mohammed VI’s reforms seem rather superficial and symbolic, as they do not alter the fundamental power relations. Real democratization will mean that the powerful will have to share power and resources, and it is very uncertain whether that willingness exists, or whether the ruling powers realize that such reform is necessary to contain revolutionary tendencies. The regime seems to have bought time with the constitutional reform, but they have not eliminated the main causes of deep discontent, which also runs very high in Morocco, and which might give the movement more impetus. The Moroccan king has certainly more historical legitimacy than Gaddafi, Ben Ali or Mubarak, but this does not mean that his legitimacy is without limits. Moroccans are deeply aware that their society is fundamentally undemocratic and inequal and most wish to see this changed. So, it would be a fatal error to think that there is a “Moroccan exception”.

SRM: The relationship between economic growth, distribution of income and people’s satisfaction with their political situation is a complex one. What do you consider to be the driving socio-economic factors that will shape Morocco’s political future, and how do they condition the implementation of political reform?

[HdH] In the longer term, for economic growth and democratization, this would be the ability to reform the broken public education system. Particularly primary education is crippled by the language question, the rise of private education, badly paid and unmotivated teachers and inadequate inspection. Morocco’s education track record is the worst of the MENA, together with Yemen.

Another crucial dimension is the ability to combat unemployment and lift people out of absolute poverty – this can only be achieved through more equitable sharing of public resources and effective taxation of the privileged. Another key to development would be the setting up of a decent public health system. The lack of means and corruption often force very poor people into the expensive private sector. The fear of illness is stifling in Morocco and undermines people’s wellbeing and willingness to take risk and to invest.

SRM: On the other side of the Mediterranean, preoccupation emigration colours, if not taints, European reactions to the Arab Spring. Here in Berlin, ludicrous ideas about supporting the revolutions by scooping up “good immigrants”, i.e. doctors, engineers, and IT specialists, are being discussed. To present the exploitation of Maghreb countries’ investments in human capital as some form of indirect development aid is not only the pinnacle of Europe’s superiority complex, but also shows a blatant lack of understanding for migratory dynamics. Based on your extensive research into determinants of migration, can you disentangle how the different degrees of political upheaval affect emigration from the Maghreb countries?

[HdH] There is no evidence whatsoever that the Arab Spring has significantly increased emigration. Migration researchers knew that this mass emigration was not going to happen, but such opinions have been systematically ignored by politicians and media, because apocalyptic stories about miserable and desperate Africans invading Europe draw large audiences. And then, what has been the European response to the Arab Spring in terms of immigration policy? A disgrace! While the Tunisian government accepted tens of thousands of refugees fleeing the violence and greatly facilitated the work by UNHCR and IOM, wealthy European countries were arguing and haggling about sharing the “burden” of a few thousands of asylum seekers and refugees.

Looking to the future, how migratory dynamics will evolve fundamentally depends on what changes will come out of the Arab Spring. If reforms are at least moderately successful politically and economically, emigration from the Maghreb is likely to decrease; if unsuccessful, new generations of jobless, but higher skilled, will continue to emigrate. Whether they will mainly go to Europe though is quite another question. The financial and economic crises in Europe make it less attractive as a destination. It might well lose out to countries such as Canada, which has a completely different self-perception as an emigration destination.

Sitting here in Berlin, the discussion left me seeing Morocco as less of an exception to the revolutionary “trend” than as an example of how these energies can unfold in a politically more benign setting. It is too early to dismiss the Moroccan uprisings as lukewarm, but long enough into the Arab Spring to dismiss the EU response as unreflective, awkward, and failing to grasp the significance of these events. These young Maghrebis who take to the streets, demand reforms, force rulers to explain themselves and bring down entire regimes, these young protesters, whose no-nonsense, hands-on approach to making a better life for themselves, made the Arab Spring possible. They want to have a future, and are claiming it out of their own strength. They are not waiting for political systems on the other side of the Mediterranean to give it to them. If, in the face of this energy, Europe fails to be humbled and motivated to work towards a new Pan-Mediterranean future, it will be Europe’s loss.

Sabria Regragui Mazili is one of the winners of EMAJMagazine Ramadan Coverage Contest with her text How can I describe it… Detox Deluxe?